Con-E.2.11 — Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Applies to Jubilee Design

Severity: E (Moderate) | Sphere: Se1, Se2 | Target: ax25

Even granting that periodic redistribution is desirable, designing a modern Jubilee system faces Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1951). Implementation requires translating “redistribute accumulated advantage” into specific policy decisions: which assets, what thresholds, to whom, what exceptions. Arrow’s theorem guarantees that no aggregation mechanism can simultaneously satisfy non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and unrestricted domain.

This guarantees persistent disagreement about “fair” redistribution, political coalitions opposing any specific implementation, and cycling (no stable majority for any design). This is not merely a practical obstacle; it is a mathematical impossibility. The PET system claims the Jubilee System is mathematically necessary (th8, ax25) but does not address the mathematical impossibility of designing it in a way that satisfies basic fairness criteria.

Academic support: Arrow (1951), Social Choice and Individual Values. Gibbard (1973), Econometrica 41(4):587–601. Sen (1970), JPE 78(1):152–157: weaker conditions than Arrow’s lead to impossibility when individual liberty is preserved — directly relevant since ax15–ax17 insist on preserving agency.

(Source: C2.11 from OOv1 Critique Round 2.)