Con-E.9 — ax15 (Libertarian Free Will) Is Contested; Compatibilism Undermines ax17

Severity: E (Moderate) | Sphere: Se5 | Target: ax15, th5, th7

ax15 asserts “genuine agency” — that humans can choose among alternatives within D_free. The text claims denial is “performatively self-refuting.” But this holds only under a libertarian account of agency.

The compatibilist position (held by 59.2% of professional philosophers; Bourget and Chalmers 2023) holds that “genuine choice” is compatible with determinism. Under compatibilism, ax15 can be accepted, but ax17’s guidance/force distinction loses its force: if human choices are determined by prior causes (including divine sustaining per ax9), then the distinction between “guidance” and “force” collapses. God sustaining the entire causal chain (ax9) while claiming to only “guide” (ax17) is, under compatibilism, a distinction without a difference.

The hard determinist / hard incompatibilist position (Pereboom 2001) rejects ax15 outright. Under this view, the “performative self-refutation” argument fails because making an argument is a caused event, not a free choice.

Steel-man: If ax15 is weakened to compatibilism, ax17’s non-coercion principle becomes unmotivated. If ax15 is rejected entirely, th5 (Divine Non-Responsibility) fails and the innovation theodicy collapses. The practical self-destruction conclusion (the Jubilee System is needed) could still stand, but the theological framework (God seeks volunteers) would not. Dennett (2003) argues the libertarian free will that ax15 presupposes is incoherent and unnecessary; Pereboom (2001) argues moral practices can be grounded without it.

(Source: C9 from OOv1 Critique Round 1.)